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ABSTRACT 
In this article, we analyzed the development of the structure of the financial system and the implemen-
tation of monetary policy in Japan. Firstly, the pre-reform financial system was discussed extensively. 
Secondly, a classification of financial institutions according to their business features and customers was 
given. Thirdly, we concentrated on the money markets because of their importance for monetary policy 
making in Japan. These markets were divided into the interbank and open money markets. 
Fourthly, regarding the process of financial reform five strongly interrelated sub-processes were 
distinguished: financial innovation, financial liberalization, financial globalization, financial concentrati-
on and restoring of financial reputation. 
Fifthly, an analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Japan was presented for the 
whole post World War II period. Regarding the implementation of monetary policy a distinction was 
made between three subsequent periods: the traditional (1953-1975), new (1975-1981) and modern 
monetary policy (1981-present). 
Finally, we will discuss the relationship between the monetary authorities in Japan against the 
background of recent developments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until the eighties Japan was mainly concerned with high economie growth promoted by considerable 
exports to the United States and Western Europe. After the rapid appreciation of the yen, following the 
Plaza agreement of September 1985, Japan's economie growth was mainly supported by the expansion 
of domestic demand. The Japanese companies and financial institutions could finance the required in-
vestments from the voluminous household savings and could also accumulate substantial reserves. 
These reserves enabled Japanese companies and financial institutions to extend strongly their direct 
foreign investments. Furthermore, after the rise of Japanese industry, the second half of the eighties 
were characterized by the advance of Japanese banking and securities business. The financial 
institutions were primarily focused on domestic developments, but during recent years they became 
more conscious of their dominance in the global financial system. Measured by the size of assets, no 
less than nine of the ten biggest banks in the world were of Japanese origine1. Furthermore, the big 
four Japanese securities companies all belong to the world top ten. Moreover, the monetary policy by 
the Bank of Japan increasingly affects the international monetary system. On the one side the domestic 
credit expansion in Japan influences the global money supply, on the other side Japanese exchange and 
money market management plays a prominent part in the process of international monetary coordination 
within the Group of Three (G3) and the Group of Seven (G7). 
In this article we will discuss the evolution of the financial system in Japan during the whole post 
World War II period and its consequences for the monetary policy implemented by the Bank of Japan. 
Firstly, the structure of the Japanese financial system during the high growth period (1953-1972) and 
the Japanese financial institutions and markets are set out with emphasis on depository institutions and 
on interbank and open money markets because of their relevance for monetary policy. 
Secondly, we describe the progress of the process of financial reform in Japan which took off in the 
late seventies and early eighties. 
Thirdly, the objectives, indicators and instruments of monetary policy by the Bank are analysed widi 
special reference to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. A distinction is made between the 
traditional (1953-1975), new (1975-1981) and modern monetary policy (1981-present). 
THE PRE-REFORM FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The financial system of a country can be defined as the whole structure of financial institutions and 
markets. In the first part of this article, we will concentrate on the structural characte- ristics of 
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financial institutions and markets in Japan. Before presenting a survey of the actual situation, the pre-
reform financial system will be analysed. This analysis will serve as background for the understanding 
of the contemporary Japanese financial system. 
The end of World War II brought the occupation period in Japan (1945-1952). During this period, the 
Suprème Commander of Alied Powers (SCAP) introduced several reforms with respect to the structure 
of the financial system2. Some reforms were embedded in explicit, western style laws, which would 
determine an important part of the postwar financial framework in Japan. 
The most important legal reform was undoubtedly the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Law in 
1948, which established the legal separation of banking and securities business, in particular by Article 
65 of that law. The Securities and Exchange Law was partly based on the Glass-Steagall Act which 
separated banking and securities business in the United States3. Article 65 prohibits banks from 
engaging in the securities business, unless there is an investment motive or a trust contract. In the 
prewar period, there was no legal provision which separated Japanese banking and securities activities. 
The purpose of the legal confirmation by the SCAP of the banking-securities separation was according 
to Suzuki (1987) and McCall Rosenbluth (1989) firstly to protect bank depositors from banks' risky 
holdings of equities or long-term securities, and secondly to stimulate the development of securities 
companies and the level of direct fmance (disintermediation) in Japan. 
Other legal reforms were the promulgation and the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law and the 
Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law in 1947. The Anti-Monopoly Law established a formal anti-
trust framework in Japan. lts revised version of 1976 restricted the holding of equity of any company 
by Japanese banks to a maximum of 5% (formerly 10%)4. The Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment 
Law, which is still not officially abolished, placed upper limits (ceilings) on some loan rates and most 
deposit rates. 
Examples of other reforms introduced by the SCAP are the dissolution of the prewar Zaibatsu 
conglomerates, the reorganization of specialized banks into long-term credit banks and new public 
financial institutions5. Furthermore, the establishment of the so-called Dodge Line, i.e. the adoption of 
a balanced budget policy in 1949, banned the flotation of government bonds to cover current deficits. 
The Dodge Line was abolished in 19656. 
The SCAP reforms were only a part of a larger group of factors which determined the structure of the 
postwar financial system, such as the prewar financial structure and the unique economie, social and 
cultural environment of Japan7. 
The evolving structure of the postwar financial system was expected to fulfil three important require-
ments8. Firstly and most importantly, the system had to supply sufficiënt long-term funds to realize 
economies of scale for developing industries, using borrowed technology (the "catch-up" process). The 
second role assigned to the financial system was enhancing the availability of funds in low productivity 
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and traditional areas. Thirdly, the financial system was required to be safe and stable. 
The financial system during the postwar period of high economie growth, the so-called high growth 
period (1953-1972), has been characterized in numerous publications of the Bank of Japan by four 
distinctive features9. 
The first and dominant characteristic of the Japanese financial system, or, more specifically, of the 
Japanese banking system during the period 1953-1975 was the so-called situation of overloan. Overloan 
can be described as "... the existence of loans and investments funded from sources other than deposits 
and equity capital, so that reserve assets (taken as the sum of central bank money plus second-line 
reserve assets minus borrowed funds) are consistently negative" [Suzuki (1980), p.5]. Borrowed funds 
include loans from the central bank and borrowing from the money market. It is important to stress that 
in the case of Japan overloan not only existed at a micro level, i.e. a situation of overloan of individual 
banks, but also at a macro level. The macro based situation of overloan implied that the banking system 
as a whole was in debt to the Bank of Japan and depended very much for its funding on central bank 
credit. 
A second characteristic of the financial system during the high growth period was the predominance of 
indirect finance (intermediation), mainly resulting from the underdevelopment of capital markets. This 
preference for indirect finance can be explained partly by the domination of the flow of funds by 
transactions based on customer relationships rather than on funding through the capital market10. The 
emphasis on customer relationships can be found in the so-called main bank system. Most companies 
had a very close relationship with one or more main banks. These banks operated as a kind of lender of 
last resort and supported their clients in many ways. Furthermore, the underdevelopment of capital 
markets was caused by the low level of flotation of government bonds, the use of interest rate and 
foreign capital controls, and the reduced level of asset accumulation after World War II. As a result, 
the development of the bond market was seriously hampered11. 
The situation of overborrowing was a third characteristic of the financial structure during the high 
growth period. Overborrowing refers to corporate finance and indicates a condition of heavy depen-
dence of the corporate sector on bank borrowing, in Japan resulting from the low level of internal 
financing and the predominance of indirect finance12. 
The fourth and final characteristic of the financial system during the high growth period has been the 
permanent imbalance of liquidity between financial institutions. One group of financial institutions (i.e. 
the city banks) was chronically in need of funds, while another group (i.e. the regional, sogo and 
shinkin banks and other financial institutions) was in surplus of funds. 
The classification of the Japanese financial system during the high growth period on the basis of these 
four characteristics has been questioned by Royama (1988). 
Royama warns for interpreting these superficially observed characteristics as structural features and 
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questions whether the four characteristics were uniquely applying to Japan. For example, the imbalance 
of bank liquidity has also been observed iii the United States since the late sixties. However, this 
situation has not been explicitly mentioned as an unique characteristic of the U.S. financial system. 
Furthermore, the predominance of indirect finance in Japan from an international perspective has been 
doubted by Kuroda and Oritani13. They have pointed out that a more consistent definition of indirect 
finance and adjustment for different accounting methods in the United States and Japan show more or 
less equal levels of indirect finance in both countries. Against the background of these remarks, we will 
present an additional classification of the high growth period financial system. This classification is 
mostly based on the regulation of the Japanese financial system. As regarding the structure of 
regulation, the financial system during the high growth period has been regulated on several points. 
Essentially, five kinds of regulations can be distinguished: 
- regulation of structure and activities of financial institutions 
- regulation of interest rates 
- regulation of entry into financial markets 
- regulation of international capital movements 
- regulation of creation of new financial instruments 
Based on Teranishi (1986b) and (1990) 
Firstly, regulations existed with respect to the structure and activities of financial institutions. One can 
speak of a functional segmentation of financial institutions14. We already discussed the separation of 
securities and banking business. Furthermore, banking and trust business have been separated and a 
specialization of lending areas for financial intermediaries has been established. Some financial 
institutions have specialized in long-term finance, while others became occupied with short-term lending 
activities. Moreover, specialization of lending areas can be found in special financial institutions for 
small and medium-sized firms and agricultural business. 
Secondly, the high growth period was characterized by a system of interest rate regulation. The 
Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law (TIRAL) established upper limits (ceilings) for various 
deposit interest rates. Since 1970, deposit interest rates are informally regulated according to guidelines 
from the Bank of Japan, within the limits of the TIRAL. Furthermore, the TIRAL limited lending 
interest rates in cases of loans of more than one million yen in amount or shorter than one year in 
length. Below these ceilings, the Federation of Bankers' Associations of Japan voluntarily fixed their 
maximum lending rates15. This system was in 1959 replaced by a Standard rate system, more or less 
comparable with the prime rate system in the United States. According to Royama (1983/1984), in 
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1975 the cartel-like agreement with respect to the establishment of the Standard rate was abolished. 
It has to mentioned that compensating deposits were used to evade the regulation of lending rates. By 
raising the amount of required deposits of borrowers, banks were able to increase effective lending 
rates. Furthermore, during the high growth period about 60% of bank loans were beyond the scope of 
regulation16. Therefore, it may be concluded that regulation of lending rates was not effective and that 
effective loan rates in f act cleared the market17. 
Another aspect of interest rate regulation was the issuing of bonds with prices artificially higher than 
prevailing market prices, causing issue rationing by the Council for the Regulation of Bond Issues 
(Kisaikai)18, and hampering the development of secondary bond markets. 
The specialization of bank lending activities combined with interest rate regulation has been called the 
"artificial low interest rate policy" and can be outlined as follows19. In financial markets, such as the 
market for bank deposits, interest rates were explicitly fixed by monetary authorities. On the contrary, 
in the market for bank loans and the interbank money market, interest rate regulation was rather weak 
and took a more implicit form. 
The "artificial low interest rate policy" resulted in a so-called dual interest rate structure, consisting of 
relatively free but higher interest rates in interbank markets, and strictly regulated and artificial lower 
interest rates in other markets, such as deposit markets20. 
Thirdly, the regulation during this period referred to the entry into financial markets. As we have seen, 
the Kisaikai regulated the issue of bonds. Furthermore, the primary market for equity was restricted to 
relatively large firms. With respect to short-term financial markets, the money market was not open to 
non-banks until the rise of the Gensaki-market in the early seventies. 
Fourthly, during the high growth period international capital movements to and from Japan have been 
strictly regulated. According to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act of 1947, all 
financial transactions with foreign countries were forbidden in principle, with freedom of international 
financial transactions as an exception21. The regulation of international capital fiows enabled monetary 
authorities to sustain the structure of the postwar financial system by closing the loopholes of interest 
rate regulation and controlling the foreign source of the money supply22. 
Fifthly and finally, the creation of new financial instruments during the high growth period was strictly 
regulated and thus financial innovations were suppressed. As a result, the variety of financial 
instruments was very limited. 
In addition, the financial system of the high growth period can be characterized by two other factors, 
i.e. a complementary relationship between private and public financial institutions and an accommoda-
ting stance of monetary policy23. This complementary relationship meant that private financial 
intermediaries were mostly focusing their lending activities at market interest rates (through compensa-
ting deposits) on the growing and modern sector of the economy, whilst public financial intermediaries 
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directed their funds at regulated interest rates towards the declining, traditional sector and supplied 
runds for social provisions. 
The structure of the high growth period financial system changed during the second half of the 
seventies. This process of financial reform will be discussed after the following description of Japanese 
financial institutions and markets. 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Japanese financial institutions can be divided into financial intermediaries and other institutions and 
the intermediaries can be subdivided into depository and non-depository institutions. A classification of 
financial institutions according to their business features and customers is given in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 
Together with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Bank of 
Japan constitute the monetary authorities in Japan. According to the Bank of Japan Law, Article 1: 
"The Bank of Japan has for its object the regulation of the currency, the control and facilitation of 
credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of the credit system, pursuant to the national 
policy, in order that the general economie activities of the nation might adequately be enhanced"24. 
Although the Bank of Japan is mainly occupied with implementing monetary policy, and the main task 
of the Ministry of Finance implies the regulation and supervision of the Japanese financial system, the 
Ministry of Finance can exercize influence with respect to the implementation of monetary policy 
through its administrative guidance (gyoosei shidoo) and legal constituted power25. 
The city banks are the largest of all commercial banks and hold from the end of March 1991 
approximately 25% of the total deposits of all financial institutions26. These banks are based in large 
cities. They possess extensive branch networks within Japan and have also international business 
networks. The city banks provide the greater part of short-term finance to domestic companies and 
belong all to the world's 25 largest banks27. It has to be mentioned that about 70% of the outstanding 
loans of city banks has a maturity of longer than one year, i.e. the traditional orientation of city banks 
on short-term lending is fading. Furthermore, the degree of concentration of city banks is increasing, as 
can be seen from the merger between Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank into Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank 
in 1990, and the merger between Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank of April 1, 1991. 
The regional banks have their headquarters throughout the country not only in large cities, but also in 
smaller cities. These banks mostly operate in local areas, i.e. their prefectures. They conduct the same 
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business as city banks, although on a smaller scale. For the most part, the regional banks lend to 
individuals and small-to-medium-sized business. Their main source of funding are individual deposits. 
The member banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks are former sogo or mutual savings 
banks, all of which but one were changed in commercial (regional) banks after February 1989. On 
April 1, 1991, the first merger between a regional bank (San-in Godo Bank) and a member of the 
Second Association of Regional Banks (i.e. Fuso Bank) came into effect. 
The long-term credit banks (LTCBs) are the most important group within the long-term financial 
institutions. The three LTCBs were organized under the Long-Term Credit Bank Law of 1952 to 
provide long-term finance to domestic manufacturers. They carry out their funding mainly by deben-
tures, but are also allowed to accept deposits from the Japanese government, local governments, private 
companies, and from individuals when the deposits are related to the purchase of debentures. 
The seven trust banks are another group of long-term financial institutions. These banks are -unlike the 
LTCBs- permitted to conduct both ordinary banking and trust businesses under separate accounts. Their 
trust activities consist of the management of loans and funds and include e.g. money trusts, securities 
investment trusts and pension funds. The Ministry of Finance approved in June 1985 the establishment 
of foreign trust banks. The first foreign trust banks (i.e. Morgan Trust Bank and Japan Bankers Trust 
Company) opened in November of that year28. 
The financial institutions for small businesses comprise four groups: the sogo banks, the shinkin banks, 
the credit co-operatives and the Shoko Chukin Bank. The sogo banks used to be mutual non-profit 
organizations, but were converted in 1951 into profit-oriented corporations. As we have seen, after 
February 1989 the Sogo banks converted their status to that of commercial (regional) banks with the 
exception of one (i.e. Toho Sogo Bank). With the announced merger of Toho Sogo Bank with a 
regional bank (lyo Bank) in April 1992, sogo banks will disappear from the Japanese financial 
system29. The shinkin banks are mutual associations of small businesses and provide ordinary banking 
services and installment businesses to their members. The credit co-operatives are cooperative financial 
institutions on a mutual base for small businesses and accept deposits and installment savings from their 
members to lend or discount bills to them. 
The Zenshinren Bank and the National Federation of Credit Co-operatives act as the central bank for 
respectively the shinkin banks and credit co-operatives. Zenshinren Bank is expanding internationally, 
as can be seen from the start on July 31, 1991, of its first securities subsidiary, Zenshinren Internatio-
nal Ltd., in London. 
The Shoko Chukin Bank is a kind of central bank for co-operatives of small and medium-sized 
businesses. Most of its activities are financed by the issue of debentures. 
The financial institutions for agriculture, forestry and fishery are organized on national, prefectorial and 
municipal level. They provide financial services to farmers, foresters and fishermen on a mutual base. 
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The Norinchukin Bank acts as the central bank for these institutions. 
The main non-depository institutions are the insurance companies, which are legally divided in two 
groups: the life insurance companies and non-life insurance companies (fire and marine insurance 
companies). The insurance companies use their premiums to lend to industrial corporations and, 
recently, to invest in securities. They hold the largest portfolio of Japanese stocks. The securities 
companies belong to the other private fmancial institutions. They dominate the primary and secondary 
markets for domestic stocks and bonds, but also play a role in the open money markets. The "big four" 
securities companies are Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi and conducted about 70% of the total 
underwriting and half of all trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. However, with the securities scandal 
of 1991 things are changing. For example, the Big Four's share of daily trading has plummeted to 
about 30% in August 199130. 
The tanshi institutions are money market dealers which are according to Suzuki (1987) active as 
specialized transaction intermediaries in the short-term money markets. The tanshi fulfill an important 
role regarding the actual implementation of monetary policy by the Bank of Japan. Banks cannot deal 
with each oüier for most purposes, and have to conduct most money market transactions through the 
tanshi institutions. The money market operations of the Japanese central bank are performed through 
these intermediaries. According to Hollerman (1988), staffmembers of the tanshi are mainly former 
Bank of Japan people who are stongly sympathetic to the policies of the Bank. 
The most important public fmancial institution is the Postal Savings System with a network of 
approximately 24.000 local post offices and around 16% of all deposits by Japanese households31. This 
institution is under the supervision of the Miriistry of Posts and Telecommunications. 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The Japanese fmancial markets are to be divided into the money markets for (very) short-term finance 
and the capital markets for medium -and long- term finance. The money markets with assets of less 
than one year maturity can be subdivided in the interbank and open money markets. The capital 
markets with assets of more than one year maturity may be split up into the primary and secondary 
markets for stocks and bonds and other markets based on these markets, such as the bond futures 
market. Hence, we shall concentrate on the money markets because of their importance for monetary 
policy making in Japan. The heart of the money market are the interbank markets where only fmancial 
institutions borrow and lend short-term funds. The main borrowers in the interbank markets are the city 
banks and large regional banks, e.g. the Bank of Yokohama, and the most important lenders are trust 
banks, the Zenshinren Bank and the Norinchukin Bank. 
The interbank markets comprise three parts: the call (money) market, the (commercial) bills market and 
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the dollar call (money) market. 
Since 1927 the call market requires as collateral government bonds or bills emitted by corporations. 
However, in July 1985 an uncoUateralized call market was created which became attractive for foreign 
banks because of the lack of collateral. 
Both on the coUateralized and uncoUateralized call market funds were traded with a very short 
maturity, from overnight till three weeks. However, with the money market reforms of November 1988 
and April 1989 the maturity range of coUateralized call money transactions has been shortened to the 
unconditional - six weeks range, and uncoUateralized transactions have now maturities between 
overnight and one year32. Of course, most transactions are for funds at the short end of the maturity 
range. 
The bills market began in 1971 as a market for discounting commercial bills with a maturity from one 
to six months. The Bank of Japan is the main buyer in the bills market and uses this market for its 
money market operations. In recent years, with the money market reforms, the maturity range for bills 
transactions has been enlarged to one week - one year33. 
The dollar call market was created in 1972 to borrow and lend foreign currency funds -mostly US 
dollars- with a (very) short maturity in Tokyo. Only domestic and foreign banks have access to this 
market. 
Besides the interbank money markets, there are also the open money markets in which both fmancial 
and non-financial institutions can participate. The open markets include eight different submarkets: the 
gensaki market, the certificate of deposit (CD) market, the Euro-yen market, the banker's acceptance 
(BA) market, the fmancial bills (FB) market (Seifu tanki shoken), the treasury bills (TB) market (Tanki 
kokusai), the Japan Off-shore market (JOM) and the commercial paper (CP) market. 
The gensaki market was officially established in 1949 as a market to sell/buy temporarily securities. 
These securities will be repurchased/resold at a predetermined time and price within six months after 
the sale/purchase. In May 1979 CDs were introduced by depository institutions, especially city banks. 
Because the CD rates are unregulated and negotiable, the CD market became an important open market 
in successive years. On the Euro-yen market off-shore transactions can be conducted without collateral 
and withholding tax. This market may be considered as one of the most liberalized open markets and 
thus functions as an substitute for domestic open markets. 
The BA market was created in June 1985 for trading BAs, i.e. a iïxed-term bill of exchange issued by 
an exporter or importer to settle a trade transaction and then underwritten by a bank. Because of 
several limitations such as complicated issuance procedures and the progressive stamp tax on the issue 
of BAs, the volume of this market has shrinked since its establishment. 
On the FB market seasonal or temporary shortages of government funds are covered by discount bills 
with a maturity of mostly 60 days. The FB rates are below the level of the discount rate and money 
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market rates and therefore virtually all issued FBs are subscribed by the Bank of Japan. The volume of 
this market is relatively limited. 
Treasury Bills have been introduced in Japan in February 1986, especially to refinance the large 
amounts of long-term Government bonds coming due from 1985 onwards. Originally TBs had a 
maturity of six months, but in August of 1989 the MoF introduced three month bills. The TB market 
reached a volume of Yen 8.2 trillion by end-April 1991. To stimulate private investment in both FBs 
and TBs, the minimum unit of these securities has in March 1990 been lowered by the Ministry of 
Finance from 50 to 10 million yen. 
The JOM, which was established in Tokyo in December 1986, is a relatively non-regulated market for 
transactions between non-residents. The JOM is separated from the domestic financial markets by the 
establishment of specific accounts and has become one of the leading off-shore centers of the world. 
In November 1987 the CP market was established and its volume has grown considerably since then. 
CPs are short-term assets issued by non-financial institutions to replace bank loans. They allow more 
flexible funding to corporations at lower costs. The CP market is often called a quasi-interbank market, 
because CPs are mainly traded among banks. On January 31, 1990, the Ministry of Finance relaxed the 
qualiiïcations with respect to issuance of commercial paper and approved CP issuance by securities 
companies. 
FINANCIAL REFORM 
Till the end of the sixties me pace of financial reform was slow in Japan. From 1973 this changed by 
the transition to floating exchange rates and the rise of inflation rates throughout the world. Fur-
thermore, the first oil crisis marking the end of the high growth period resulted in large issues of 
Japanese government bonds to finance public debt. The shift to lower economie growth and higher 
levels of public debt, combined with the increasing accumulation of financial assets by individuals and 
the growth of internal reserves of Japanese companies, and high levels of monetary growth, raised the 
degree of interest rate sensitivity in the private non-financial sector. In addition, there was a deve-
lopment towards open money and capital markets, in particular Euro-currency markets. Furthermore, 
the shift to the floating exchange rate system stimulated the internationalization of money and finance 
and resulted in a substantial increase of international capital flows. Finally, the rapid progress of 
computer and information technology resulted in lower costs of financial innovations and higher profit 
opportunities for financial institutions34. 
With respect to the process of financial reform from a Japanese perspective, five strongly interrelated 
sub-processes can be distinguished: 
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- financial innovation 
- financial liberalization 
- financial globalization 
- financial concehtration 
- restoring of financial reputation 
Firstly, since the mid-seventies the Japanese financial system has experienced many financial innovati-
ons, i.e. the introduction of new financial products, techniques and markets. Examples are respectively 
the introduction of such different financial products as certificates of deposit (CDs) and financial 
derivates (options and futures), the use of new techniques of asset and Hability management, and the 
establishment of new markets, e.g. the Japan Off-shore market and the Tokyo International Financial 
Futures Exchange (TIFFE). 
Secondly, the last 15 years have shown the abolishment or lessening of many financial regulations in 
Japan. This so-called process of financial liberalization has affected the regulatory framework regarding 
the structure and activities of financial institutions, interest rates, entry into financial markets, 
international capital movements and creation of new financial instruments. 
A third aspect of financial reform is formed by the process of financial globalization. The process of 
financial globalization "... indicates a further strengthening of the ties among national financial markets 
so that they have actually changed into a unified financial system on a worldwide scale" [Suzuki 
(1989), p.158]. The lifting of exchange and international capital controls and limitations on entry by 
foreign financial institutions into domestic markets, the growth of off-shore markets, the development 
of 24 hour global trading, the increased use of national currencies outside the country of issue and of 
new intemationally traded financial products have all contributed to the globalization of financial 
markets35. 
Fourthly, in recent years the Japanese financial system has been characterized by an increasing number 
of mergers between financial institutions, resulting in a substantial higher level of concentration of 
financial institutions. 
Fifthly and fmally, as a result of the stock compensation and fake deposit scandals during the summer 
of 1991 the Japanese financial system will have to restore confidence among investors. This rebuilding 
of financial reputation will have consequences for the future structure of the Japanese financial system. 
With respect to financial innovations, the most important were the introduction of CDs in May 1979 
and money market certificates (MMCs) in March 1985 by banks and the creation of so-called chukoku 
funds -i.e. portfolios containing medium-term government bonds- in January 1980 by securities 
companies36. The process of financial innovation and liberalization had its impact on the Japanese 
financial system. At first this meant a gradual relaxation and abolishment of interest rate regulations -
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i.e. interest rate ceilings - for large bank deposits. Hence, interest rates for deposits of three months to 
two years maturity with a minimum amount of one billion yen were fully liberalized in October 1985. 
Furthermore, this minimum for large time deposits was gradually reduced to 10 million yen in October 
1990. The Ministry of Finance has already decided to deregulate fixed term deposits of three million 
yen or more in the fall of 1991. Moreover, interest rates on time deposits of less than half a million 
yen are to be liberalized by the summer of 199237. The Hberalization of time deposits will likely be 
completed in 1993. The Ministry wants to liberalize interest rates on checkable bank deposits by the 
spring of 1994. A complete Hberalization of interest rates had been hampered by the existence of 
attractive savings accounts with the non-profit-oriented Postal Savings System. However, study groups 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications have made recommen-
dations to resolvè these problems, and continuing negotiations between both ministries will ultimately 
end in some kind of compromise. Another aspect of Hberalization was the reduction of the minimum 
amount for CDs to 50 million yen and for a new type of small MMCs (the so-called Super-MMCs, 
introduced in June 1989) to half a million yen from April 1991, and the abolishment of the maximum 
volume for issues of CDs and MMCs. 
Furthermore, with respect to interest rate Hberalization the introduction by Mitsubishi Bank in January 
1989 of a new short-term prime rate system has to be mentioned38. As a result of the proces of 
fmancial innovation and Hberalization, Japanese banks have to raise a growing proportion of their 
funding through the selling of liberalized fmancial instruments with (money) market related interest 
rates. The old short-term prime rate system was not flexible enough to reflect this shift to a market 
based funding structure. Under the new short-term prime rate system, interest rates are related to 
market developments and determined by the weighted average of funding costs. As regarding long-term 
prime rates, i.e. interest rates on loans with a maturity longer than one year to most preferred custo-
mers, Fuji Bank introduced a new system in April 1991. To cope with the inverted term structure of 
interest rates Fuji Bank has related its long-term prime rate to its short-term prime rate by adding a 
certain spread. Reportedly, also other city banks will introducé this new formula in the near future39. 
As a result, both short- and long-term prime rates will be related to money market developments40. 
As examples of new fmancial techniques, the increased use of funding instruments with market related 
interest rates (liability management) and spread based lending rates (asset management) and the 
introduction of securitization in the banking sector can be mentioned41. To help banks to improve their 
capital adequacy ratios against the background of the requirements of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), the Ministry of Finance has besides permitting banks to issue subordinated loans, 
allowed the securitization of housing loans (October 1988), loans for municipal governments (July 
1989) and corporate loans (March 1990)42. 
With respect to the regulation of the structure and activities of fmancial institutions, it is clear that the 
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functional segmentation of Japanese financial institutions has been blurred by financial innovation, 
liberalization and globalization. The segmentation between short-term en long-term financial activities 
and between banking and securities business is slowly but steadily losing importance. In various reports 
of the Financial System Research Council (affiliated with the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of 
Finance) and discussions by the Securities and Exchange Council (affiliated with the Securities Bureau), 
this desegmentation process is extensively discussed43. The second interim report by the Second 
Financial System Committee of the Financial System Research Council focused on two possible 
approaches, i.e. the establishment of separate subsidiaries for each field of operation and a multifuncti-
onal subsidiary. The Committee concluded that the separate subsidiary approach is the best strategy for 
commercial banks, long-term credit banks and trust banks to diversify into each otiiers' markets. In its 
report of June 1991 commercial banks, trust banks and securities firms are allowed to set up subsidia-
ries to enter each others' business. Long-term credit banks will set up trust bank and securities 
subsidiaries44. 
The internationalization of the Japanese financial system has developed rapidly, especially since the 
enactment of a new Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in December 1980 which 
provided freedom of international transactions unless explicitly prohibited (freedom in principle)45. 
Under financial globalization Japanese financial markets have become more and more integrated with 
world markets, and both Japanese financial institutions and corporations can now freely choose among 
various national financial systems to conduct Üieir transactions46. The process of financial globalization 
with respect to the money market in Japan has been stimulated by two important reforms. Firstly, the 
removal in June 1984 of the so-called swap limits or yen conversion limits, which restricted the amount 
of foreign currency that could be converted into yen by financial institutions, increased arbitrage 
between interbank markets and Euromarkets. Secondly, the internationalization of Japanese money 
markets has been stimulated by the abolition in April 1984 of the so-called real demand doctrine, which 
allowed forward exchange transactions only for trade (or real) finance. 
Anomer aspect of financial reform in Japan is the process of financial concentration. Some mergers 
between various large banks have already been mentioned. Furtiiermore, smaller financial institutions 
have been hit by the ongoing reform of the financial system, with interest rate liberalization narrowing 
their margins and larger financial institutions taking away their traditional business. Hence, small 
financial institutions are mostly either merging, being acquired by bigger institutions (for exampe the 
announced take over by Tokai Bank of Sanwa Shinkin Bank) or converting their status to an ordinary 
bank (for example sogo banks and Yachiyo Shinkin Bank). Consequently, the number and diversity of 
financial institutions in Japan are decreasing. 
Finally, the scandal-ridden Japanese financial system will have to restore its reputation amongst 
Japanese and international investors. Reformers want the establishment of a Japanese equivalent of the 
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an independent body from the Ministry of Finance 
and modifications in the regulatory legal framework. However, the specific consequences of the scan-
dals for the structure of the financial system in the years to come are not clear yet. 
MONETARY POLICY 
In this section, attention will be paid to the channels of transmission in the monetary policy process. 
In the transmission mechanism of monetary policy a number of monetary variables play an important 
role. These variables provide the central bank with the necessary information about the orientation and 
effectiveness of its monetary policy. Figure 2 shows the transmission mechanism. 
FIGURE 2 
The indicator is the starting point of the monetary policy process. This monetary variable is close to the 
central bank and is directly affected by the policy instruments. The relationship of the indicator with the 
goals of monetary policy, i.e. the final policy objectives, is according to Suzuki (1987) somewhat 
unstable. Therefore, the target is used as an intermediate objective. The target is farther from the 
control of the central bank and is not directly affected by the policy instruments, but its relationship 
with the goals of monetary policy is relatively stable. 
In the following subsections, a brief analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Japan 
is presented for three subsequent periods. A distinction will be made between the traditional (1953-
1975), new (1975-1981) and modern monetary policy (1981-present). 
THE TRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY 1953-1975 
The traditional monetary policy coincided with the high growth period, the already mentioned period of 
high economie growth which started in 1953. During this period the main source of corporate finance 
was bank credit. As we have seen, the heavy dependence of the corporate sector on credit from 
depository financial institutions, i.e. the situation of overborrowing and the predominance of indirect 
finance, was mainly caused by the underdevelopment of the capital markets. 
It will become clear from the following analysis that the heavy dependence of the corporate sector on 
bank credit and the situation of overloan were of great importance for the implementation of the 
traditional monetary policy. On the basis of figure 2 we will present a brief review of Japanese 
monetary policy during the period 1953-1975. 
The starting point of the traditional monetary policy was formed by the interbank (money) markets. 
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The Bank of Japan used the interbank interest rates, i.e. the call rate and after 1971 the bill discount 
rate, as indicators. 
The Bank of Japan exerted great infiuence on the interbank (money) markets through its lending policy. 
Of great importance in this policy was the reserve system of the Bank, which is still effective today. 
The commercial fmancial institutions are under the reserve system required to hold non-interest bearing 
deposits at the Bank of Japan against their private deposits. 
The fmancial institutions are free to decide the daily amount of these deposits, if at the end of the reser-
ve period the corhpulsory amount of reserve deposits is attained. The reserve deposits consist mainly of 
credit of the Bank of Japan, so the lending policy of the Bank has a great impact on the reserve 
position of fmancial institutions. It is important to stress the focus of the lending policy of the Bank of 
Japan at the so-called reserve progress ratio, i.e. the ratio of the actual amount of reserve deposits to 
the compulsory amount of reserve deposits. By changing the amount of its credit, the Bank of Japan 
exerts great infiuence on the amount of reserve deposits at fmancial institutions and so on the interbank 
interest rates. For example, rationing of credit by the Bank of Japan decreases the sum of the individual 
reserve progress ratios of the various fmancial institutions. When the end of the reserve period comes 
nearer, fmancial institutions with an insufficiënt amount of reserve deposits (i.e. below the compulsory 
level at the end of the reserve period concerned) are forced to borrow in the interbank markets. As a 
result, interbank interest rates will rise. 
The lending policy of the Bank of Japan was very effective during the period 1953-1975, mainly as a 
result of the macro situation of overloan. This situation implied that banks were heaviiy dependent on 
central bank credit, and therefore changes in tiie amount of credit of the Bank of Japan had great 
consequences for the reserve and funding positions of banks and consequently for interbank interest 
rates. 
Besides the lending policy the Bank of Japan did have other policy 
instruments to control interbank interest rates. The various instruments are presented in figure 3. 
The main instrument was the lending policy of the Bank of Japan. The securities and bills operations, 
i.e. the buying and setting of securities and bills by the Bank of Japan, were focused on neutralizing 
money market surpluses and shortages. Because these operations took place between the Bank of Japan 
and depository fmancial institutions, they did not have a direct effect on the money supply. Conse-
quently, these securities and bills operations of the Bank of Japan were not open market operations in 
the true sense47. A better qualification might be quasi-open market operations. 
Changes in the official discount rate were intended to give signals about the policy intentions of the 
Bank of Japan (so-called announcement effect). Changes in the reserve ratios, which determine the 
amount of reserves banks have to deposit at the Bank of Japan in relation to their deposits and other 
liabilities, only had a modest effect on interbank interest rates. 
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The implicit interest rate regulation was an informal instrument of the Bank of Japan to regulate 
interbank interest rates. The interbank interest rates were fixed after close consultations between the 
Bank of Japan and the tanshi institutions. The Bank of Japan did have a great influence on the tanshi, 
so that the interbank interest rates could be fixed according to the policy objectives of the Bank. 
The target of the traditional monetary policy was the broadly based lending by banks, mainly to the 
corporate sector. Broadly based corporate credit included ordinary bank credit to the corporate sector 
and the absorption of corporate bills and securities by banks. The main argument in favour of this 
specific target was the situation of overborrowing and predominance of indirect finance. Because of 
these situations broadly based corporate credit was a good proxy for the volume of business invest-
ments and the level of economie growth. 
FIGURE 3 
The process by which the interbank interest rates (the indicators) 
affected the direction of the broadly based lending by banks was very clear and stable and can be 
presented as follows. Interest rates on broadly based bank credit were, mainly as a result of legal 
regulations, informal agreements and cultural customs, inflexible compared with interbank interest 
rates. The rigid structure of credit interest rates resulted in substitution effects between on the one hand 
activities of banks in the interbank money markets and on the other hand the amount of broadly based 
lending by banks. For example, when interbank interest rates rosé as a result of monetary policy 
actions by the Bank of Japan, the inflexibility of credit interest rates caused a shift out of bank credit 
towards investments in the interbank money markets. This increase of funds in the interbank market 
could be neutralized by offsetting operations of the Bank of Japan. 
The end of the monetary policy process is the link between the target(s) and the goal(s). The main 
goals of the traditional monetary policy were the achievement of price stability (CPI) and equilibrium in 
the balance of payments (BOP). Through regulation of the broadly based lending by banks the Bank of 
Japan was able to control the level of business investments, i.e. the main impetus of the high economie 
growth, and therefore aggregate demand, inflation and the balance of payments. 
An additional instrument to control the broadly based lending by banks was the so-called window 
guidance, in the words of Suzuki (1987) "... guidance to the financial institutions to keep the increase 
in their lending to clients within limits that the Bank of Japan feels to be appropriate". Window 
guidance is a kind of moral suasion, but as a result of the situation of overloan, this form of monetary 
policy can be very effective. 
Figure 4 shows a review of the traditional monetary policy. 
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FIGURE 4 
THE NEW MONETARY POLICY 1975-1981 
During the first part of the seventies the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis had a 
great impact on the world economy. Economie growth in Japan slowed down and the government was 
forced to introducé an accomodating Keynesian oriented monetary and economie policy. As a result, 
the rate of inflation increased rapidly. 
The crisis in the Japanese economy had great consequences for the economie and financial structures. 
The shift to lower growth reduced the corporate demand for credit and resulted in a sharp decline in 
the situation of overborrowing. The large-scale issues of government bonds, necessary to finance the 
accomodating monetary and economie policies, stimulated the development of the securities market and 
decreased the predominance of indirect finance, i.e. increased direct finance in Japan. The decline in 
the situations of overborrowing and indirect finance decreased the importance of credit in the monetary 
policy process. 
The process of financial reform, which starled around 1975, increased the flexibility of interest rates. 
This development decreased the effectiveness of the channel between interbank interest rates and 
broadly based lending by banks of the traditional monetary policy. 
Another problem for the effectiveness of the traditional monetary policy was caused by the large-scale 
issues of government bonds. The main part of these issues was absorbed by banks, i.e. money creating 
financial institutions. As a result, the money supply increased rapidly. 
It will be clear that the target of the traditional monetary policy, i.e. the broadly based lending of banks 
to the corporafe sector, neglected the money creating effect of the government bond issues. It was 
mostly for this reason that the Bank of Japan introduced in 1978 a new target, namely the money 
supply: from July 1978 to the third quarter of 1979 the broad based money supply M2 and from the 
third quarter of 1979 the monetary aggregate M2+CDs. The Bank of Japan started to publish its 
forecast of M2+CDs in 1978. These forecasts have the status of projections and should not be regarded 
as targets in the context of a strict monetarist policy. Officials of the Bank of Japan have stressed this 
fact in several publications and mentioned the pragmatic attitude of the Bank towards control of the 
money supply48. 
It has already been mentioned that the process of financial reform decreased the effectiveness of the 
influence of interbank interest rate changes on broadly based lending of banks, and therefore also de-
creased the impact of changes in interbank interest rates on the money supply. Financial reform caused 
the creation of more open, relatively non-regulated financial markets with more flexible interest rates. 
As a result, two additional channels of transmission between interbank interest rates and money supply 
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were established. 
The first was the channel of fmancial disintermediation. Because open markt interest rates were more 
flexible than bank deposit interest rates, which were still regulated, changes in interbank interest rates 
had a greater impact through interest rate arbitrage on open markt interest rates. Depositholders were 
more inclined to invest funds on the open markets when a rise in interbank interest rates caused open 
market interest rates to rise. As a result, the funding position and consequently the amount of bank 
lending deteriorated. Of course, the supply of funds to the open market increased. These funds could be 
borrowed directly from the market by big corporations through the issue of securities or commercial 
paper to replace the decrease of bank credit (increase of direct finance). However, selling operations of 
the Bank of Japan absorbed these additional funds in the open market49. 
The second channel included the effects of changes in interest rates on private expenditure. Interbank 
interest rate changes caused open market interest rates to change and eventually influenced even interest 
rates of broadly based lending by banks. Hence, the opportunity costs of expenditures by surplus 
sectors (i.e. the yields on open market investments) and the costs of financing of expenditures by deficit 
sectors changed. These changes influenced the amount of private expenditures and eventually the level 
of national income, money demand and money supply. 
The transmission process of the new monetary policy is presented in figure 5. Seen against the 
background of the inflationary experiences in the first part of the seventies, the main goal of the new 
monetary policy became the achievement of price stability, reflected by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) in figure 5. A secondary goal was the level of economie growth. The yen/U.S.dollar exchange 
rate was introduced as a secondary target to stress the importance of preventing import inflation. 
FIGURE 5 
THE MODERN MONETARY POLICY 1981-present 
The year 1981 was the turning point towards a new type of monetary policy, the so-called modern 
monetary policy. In May of that year the Bank of Japan started to sell financing bills on the open 
market to absorb liquidity surpluses. According to Suzuki (1987) "... This was the first time since the 
end of the Second World War that the Bank of Japan had engaged in an open-market operation in the 
true sense of the term" [Suzuki (1987), p.322]. Open market operations are the purchasing or selling of 
securities by the central bank on the open market from non-depository fmancial institutions and the 
non-financial private sector, and influence directly the money supply. 
As we have seen, the already mentioned securities and bills operations (quasi-open market operations) 
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are engaged between the Bank of Japan and money creating fmancial institutions, and in contrast to 
open market operations do not directly infiuence the money supply. However, the securities and bills 
operations do have indirect effects on the money supply. 
Firstly, buying or selling by the Bank of Japan of securities and bills in possession of money creating 
fmancial institutions increases or decreases the amount of reserves of these institutions. The money 
creating fmancial institutions will try to compensate the changes in their reserves on the interbank 
money markets. As a result, changing interbank interest rates will induce portfolio adjustments by these 
fmancial institutions and will consequently change the amount of their lending and eventually the the 
size of the money supply. However, the process of liberalisation of interest rates will make this channel 
less important. 
Secondly, the above mentioned changing of interbank interest rates will infiuence interest rates on the 
open markets and in the end the level of private investments, money demand and money supply. 
The Bank of Japan uses the securities and bills operations - more specific the outright purchase of 
goverment bonds from fmancial institutions - as an instrument to provide the Japanese economy with 
additional base money without directly disrupting the growth of the money supply. 
Because of the underdeveloped state of the government bond market in previous decades, open market 
operations could be introduced only in 1981. The Dodge Line prohibited government deficit financing 
before 1965. After 1974 the return to a balanced budget financing policy was seriously debated. 
The main reason to introducé open market operations by the Bank of Japan was the development of 
open, less regulated fmancial markets in Japan, such as the market for certificates of deposit (1979) and 
the Euroyenmarket and later on the introduction of markets for bankers acceptances (1985), money 
market certificates (1985) and commercial paper (1987) and the Tokyo offshore market (1986). The 
interest rates on these markets are relatively free. As a result, the share of the open markets in the total 
money market increased from 1984. This development continued until the autumn of 1988 when the 
volume of the interbank market, especially the bills market, shrinked as a result of increasing open 
market rates, compared with relatively stable interest rates in the interbank market. The decreasing 
volume of the interbank market reduced the infiuence of the Bank of Japan on the money market rate 
and compelled the Bank to deregulate the interbank market as from November 1988. The elements of 
this introduction of the so-called new monetary control regime can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the Bank liberalized the interest rate of (commercial) bills which was regulated till then 
(abolition of quotation). Secondly, the range of maturities for the collateralized call market and the bill 
market was adjusted in order to realize more fine tuning in the money market50- Thirdly, the quan-
titative restrictions and quotation system for the uncollateralized call market were abolished and the 
permitted maturity for this market was extended from overnight-three weeks to overnight-six months to 
reinforce the arbitrage between interbank and open markets. These swift and radical measures by the 
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Bank of Japan resulted in more than a doubling of the interbank market volume during the period 
November 1988-July 1989. 
Moreover, the arbitrage between interbank and open markets strenghened in that period as appears 
from the narrowing difference of interbank and open market rates. See for this difference Figure 6. 
FIGURE 6 
The November reforms permitted the Bank of Japan to maintain the controUability of short-term 
interest rates in spite of the ongoing fmancial reform process51. Before the reforms, interbank 
transactions with a maturity of less than one month had been mainly conducted in the call market, and 
not in the bills market. Therefore, for its bills operations the Bank of Japan had to rely on bills with 
maturities of two or three months. As a result, market participants regarded especially the two-month 
bill discount rate as a policy target by mid-1988, and sometimes interpreted technical adjustments as 
being deliberate, or deliberate adjustments as being technical52. Furthermore, according to Suzuki 
(1989b) the two and three month bills operations by the Bank of Japan revealed its interest rate view 
two or three months ahead. Under the new monetary control regime, the Bank concentrates on the 
shortest maturities (overnight call rates and one to three week bill discount rates)53, and leaves the rates 
of longer maturity instruments to move freely in accordance with market conditions and expectations. 
With respect to open market interest rates, the Bank of Japan could influence them to a certain extent 
through the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage between interbank and open markets. However, the 
mechanism of interest rate arbitrage alone is not sufficiënt to control the interest rates on the open 
markets. Otfier factors, including differences in market expectations and different characteristics of 
various segments of the open markets, determine also open market interest rates. Furthermore, the 
declining share of the interbank markets in the total money market made it more difficult for the Bank 
of Japan to influence the interest rates on the open markets only by use of interest arbitrage. Therefore, 
the last decade saw the introduction of open market policy by the Bank of Japan as an instrument to 
exert direct influence on open markets. The Bank bas used in its open market policy various instru-
ments, such as sales of FBs with repurchase, agreements (first in May 1981), CDs (not used anymore 
since February 1989), purchases of CPs wiüi repurchase agreements (firstly May 1989) and purchases 
of TBs with resale agreements (first in January 1990). The Bank of Japan intends to extend the use of 
TBs as an open market instrument. For this purpose the market for TBs, which is still relatively small 
and underdeveloped, will have to expand and gain in importance. To facilitate the open market policy 
of the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of Finance has introduced in August 1989 three month TBs, has 
promoted the development of a secondary market by increasing the number of TB issues from one to 
two when the monthly issue volume exceeds two trillion Yen and considers to expand the issue of TBs 
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in the fiscal year through March 1992 to Yen 9 trillion . 
The open market operations of the Bank of Japan have great consequences for the money supply. The 
money supply is influenced through three channels by these operations. 
In the first place, the existence of a direct mechanism has to be 
mentioned. For example, when the Bank of Japan sells for example TBs directly to the non-financial 
sector the money supply will decrease. When the Bank of Japan sells TBs to money creating financial 
institutions, which received pennission from the Bank to resell the bills to the non-financial sector, the 
money supply will also decrease. The consequence of this operation is a deteriorating reserve position 
of the financial institutions concemed (decrease of deposit at Bank of Japan); As a result, these finan-
cial institutions will borrow funds on the interbank money market to make up their deficits. The re-
sulting increase in interbank interest rates will lead through the mechanism of interest rate arbitrage to 
rising open market interest rates, i.e. rising costs of private expenditures. It will be clear that in the end 
the level of national income, money demand and money supply will tend to decrease. This indirect 
mechanism is the second channel between open market operations and money supply. In the third 
place, the open market operations have great consequences for the supply and demand relations on the 
secondary market of TBs and consequently for the interest rates on this market. Through the channel of 
interest rate arbitrage the other open market interest rates will be influenced and finally (the familiar ef-
fects of interest rate fluctuations on private expenditures) the money supply. 
With respect to the transmission channels, the exceptional rise during the eighties of prices of assets 
such as equities and real estate strengthened the importance of wealth effects. Changes in interest rates 
influence the value of various assets and consequently the amount of private non-financial sector 
expenditures. 
The process of financial reform, especially the liberalization of interest rates, has made the effects of 
interest rate changes on private expenditures (direct channel) and these effects on asset values and 
consequently on private expenditures (indirect channel) much more important. The new short-term and 
long-term prime rate systems and the increased use by banks of funding instruments with money market 
related interest rates have made the transmission of changes in money market interest rates to lending 
and borrowing behaviour of the non-financial sector more effective54. Thus, the transmission of 
monetary policy will increasingly take place through the effects of interbank and open market 
operations of the Bank of Japan on interest rates in all markets55. 
The focusing of the Bank of Japan on market interest rates has been mentioned in Tamura (1991) and 
Nakao and Horii (1991). Furthermore, as a result of the financial reform process these officials of the 
Bank of Japan mention an increased number of caveats applying to the interpretation of the money 
supply since the mid-1980s. 
The modern monetary policy is presented in figure 7. Under the modern monetary policy market 
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interest rates and as a consequence of financial globalization also exchange rates have gained impor-
tance. Despite the caveats regarding the interpretation of the money supply the Bank of Japan still 
emphasizes the stabilization of money growth in the medium term56. Therefore, it is shown that both 
the money supply and the (U.S. dollar/yen) exchange rate are used as targets by the Bank of Japan. The 
Japanese central bank wants to achieve the goal of price stability on the one hand by controUing the 
growth of the money supply (the intemal track) and on the other hand by keeping the yen sufficiently 
strong against the U.S.dollar to prevent import inflation (the external track). For example, according to 
Hutchison (1986) the Bank of Japan has not relied fully on the intemal track but has also systematically 
focused on the external track. 
The increasing emphasis of the Bank on interest rate management is also reflected in the official ending 
of the window guidance in June 1991. From now on, the Bank of Japan has to rely solely on indirect 
credit control. 
FIGURE 7 
EPILOGUE 
In this article, we analyzed the development of the structure of the financial system and the implemen-
tation of monetary policy in Japan. Firstly, the pre-reform financial system was discussed extensively. 
Secondly, a classification of financial institutions according to their business features and customers was 
given. Thirdly, we concentrated on the money markets because of their importance for monetary policy 
making in Japan. These markets were divided into the interbank and open money markets. 
Fourthly, regarding the process of financial reform five strongly interrelated sub-processes were 
distinguished: financial innovation, financial liberalization, financial globalization, financial concentrati-
on and restoring of financial reputation. 
Fifthly, an analysis of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Japan was presented for the 
whole post World War II period. Regarding the implementation of monetary policy a distinction was 
made between three subsequent periods: the traditional (1953-1975), new (1975-1981) and modern 
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monetary policy (1981-present). 
Finally, we wiil discuss the relationship between the monetary authorities in Japan against the 
background of recent developments. 
The doublé digit growth of the aggregate M2 + CDs from 1987 was accompanied by an until recently 
gradual appreciation of the yen vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and contributed only to a limited extend to an 
increase of domestic inflation in Japan. 
At the midst of 1989 the appreciation of the yen turned into a depreciation against the dollar and other 
currencies, such as the Deutsche Mark. Thereby, the price level of import goods to Japan rosé sharply 
in 1989. The higher import price level combined with the increased stock of liquidity at the end of the 
eighties meant a considerable threat to the goal of price stability (CPI). The potential inflation 
conceived by the Bank of Japan was mainly responsible for the origin of a conflict between the central 
bank and the Ministry of Finance. In February 1990 contradictory statements by the Governor of the 
Bank of Japan and the Deputy Minister of Finance led to a public controversy between both monetary 
authorities57. During 199-0, this remarkable lack of consensus regarding future monetary policy 
resulted in much turmoil on the Japanese fmancial markets. The crux of the conflict was a deep-lying 
difference of opinion between the authorities with respect to the relative weight of price stability and 
economie growth as goals of monetary policy. Traditionally, the Bank of Japan attaches great 
importance to the goal of price stability. On the contrary, the Ministry of Finance attaches greater value 
to the goal of economie, growth. The Ministry is of the opinion that the central bank has to provide for 
ample money supply and unimpeded economie growth and should raise the official discount rate only in 
case of ultimate necessity. 
The conflict between bom authorities ought to be judged against die background of the process of 
fmancial reform in Japan and the changing balance of power regarding the decision-making and 
implementation of monetary policy. The influence of the Ministry of Finance is mostly based on 
fmancial regulation ('regulatory leverage') and is gradually declining by the progress of fmancial 
innovation and liberalization in recent years. However, the Bank of Japan derives its influence from the 
guidance and steering of fmancial markets ('market leverage') and is able to conduct step by step a 
more independent policy. The rising autonomy of the central bank is obstructed by the Ministry of 
Finance to a large extend by using its administrative guidance. The conflict focused on the official 
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discount rate, because this monetary instrument can only be changed with the formal approval of the 
Policy Board - in which the Ministry is represented - and the informal consent of the Minister of Finan-
ce58. The specific nature of the relationship between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance is 
still subject of further discussion. The monetary authorities in Japan are aware of the urgency to clarify 
their relationship and to restore and maintain their credibility in the financial markets. 
FOOTNOTES 
1) However, measured by the strengh of capital only six Japanese banks are placed in the world top 10. 
See: 'Top 1000 world banks', The Banker, July 1989, pp. 38-105. At the end of 1990, only seven of 
the ten biggest banks in the world were of Japanese origine. 
2) With respect to the influence of the SCAP policy on the structure of the financial system see for 
example McCall Rosenbluth (1989), pp.37-42, pp. 115-120 and pp. 142-145, Federation of Bankers 
Associations of Japan (1984), pp.3-5, Bank of Japan (1973), pp.45-51, and Sakakibara and Feldman 
(1983), pp. 13-14. 
3) The Glass-Steagall Act is more restrictive than article 65. According to Suzuki (1987), p.40, under 
the Glass-Steagall Act "... financial institutions were permitted to buy only negotiable securities, were 
not permitted to buy more than a certain amount of these securities of any given issuer, and were 
forbidden to hold equities. Article 65, however, places no controls whatsoever on the acquisition of 
securities and equities for investment purposes". 
4) According to McCall Rosenbluth (1989), p.40, the Ministry of Finance gave banks 10 years to get 
below this limit, but in 1986 city banks were over by 2-4 percent for many firms in their conglomerate. 
5) These reforms are mentioned by Sakakibara and Feldman (1983). The Zaibatsu, according to Cargill 
and Royama (1988), p.45, "... a type of holding company made up of manufacturing, trading, and 
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financial entities under the control of wealthy families", were officially dissoluted because the SCAP 
viewed them as anticompetitive and closely involved with Japan's militarist and expansionist policies, 
and preserving an unequal distribution of income. The dissolution of the Zaibatsu brought according to 
Sakakibara and Feldman (1983) an end to the private placement of equities with wealthy individuals, 
Zaibatsu corporations, and Zaibatsu holding companies, and resulted in an increese of indirect finance. 
However, the dissolution of the Zaibatsu has been foliowed by the establishment of more informal 
oriented conglomerates, the so called Keiretsu, with one of the city banks at its center. See for further 
information for example Johnson (1982), Viner (1987), Wright and Pauli (1987) and Cargili and 
Royama (1988) for further information with respect to the Zaibatsu and Keiretsu. 
The specialised banks were half-governmental and half-private banks, and conducted specific activities 
such as trade finance and long-term finance. 
6) The Dodge Line was named after J.Dodge, an American banker who was commissioned by the 
SCAP to assist the Japanese govemment in its effort to implement General MacAxthur's nine-point 
Economie Stabilization Plan, and to monitor its progress. The balanced-budget policy lasted until 1965, 
and hampered the development of Japanese capital markets. See Johnson (1982) and McCall Rosenbluth 
(1989). 
7) See Hamada and Horiuchi (1984) and Cargili (1985). 
8) Teranishi (1990), pp.5-6. See also Teranishi (1986a), pp. 133-137, and Teranishi (1986b), pp.149-
165. 
9) See for example Bank of Japan (1973), Suzuki (1980) and Suzuki (1987). This classification will be 
used to explain the traditional monetary policy during the period 1953-1975. 
10) Cargili and Royama (1988), p.44. These authors mention also several other factors which caused 
tiie undeveloped state of financial markets, for example the lack of a financial disclosure system, and 
collateral requirements for all debt. See chapter 2, especially pp.40ff. 
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11) Suzuki (1987), p.23, and Teranishi (1986b), p.154. 
12) Suzuki (1980), pp. 13-14. 
13) Quoted in Sakakibara and Feldman (1983), p.7. 
14) Suzuki (1987), p.35. 
15) Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan (1989), p.32, and Royama (1983/1984), p.8. 
16) Teranishi (1990), p. 12. 
17) Teranishi (1986b), p.155, and Teranishi (1990), p.12. 
18) The Council for the Regulation of Bond Issues (Kisai Chosei Kyogikai, or Kisaikai) is comprised of 
the bond related financial institutions, i.e. trustee banks and underwriting securities companies. Kisaikai 
detennines the amount of new bond issues for each fiscal year and each month, the number of issues 
per year and the issue terms [Suzuki (1980), p.51]. Further information is provided by Viner (1987), 
pp.l09ff. 
19) Royama (1983/1984), p.7, pp.8-11. Horiuchi (1984) has called this policy the "low interest rate 
policy" (tei-kinri seisaku) and defined it as a combination of regulation on some interest rates and 
comprehensive control on fimamcial allocation. 
20) Suzuki (1980), p.44ff. There still exists uncertainty about the specific nature of the relationship 
between the "artificial low interest rate policy" and postwar economie growth. For example, according 
to Horiuchi (1984), p.350, the conventional view that the "artificial low interest rate policy" stimulated 
economie growth in Japan lacks a solid foundation. Due to strong demand for funds during the pre-
reform period, both real and nominal Japanese interest rates were at substantially high levels during the 
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1950s and 1960s. Horiuchi concludes that there is need for "... more thoroughgoing reconsideration 
with respect to the low interest rate policy in postwar Japan". The analysis in Teranishi (1986b). 
pp. 162-164, with respect to the relationship between economie growth and financial regulation has 
produced inconclusive results. And also according to Royama (...), p.81, "... there are stül numerous 
issues that have to be clarified surrounding the policy of artificially low interest rates". In Teranishi 
(1990), p.23, it is carefully concluded that the postwar financial system "... has had some favorable 
effects on growth and employment". 
21) Hollerman (1988), p.25. Therefore, until 1980 international capital flows were under a so-called 
negative regime. 
22) Teranishi (1986b), p. 161. 
23) Teranishi (1986b), pp. 156-160. 
24) Suzuki (1987), p.305. 
25) From a explicit legal point of view, the Bank of Japan is not independent from the Ministry of 
Finance. For further information regarding administrative guidance and relationship between Bank of 
Japan and Ministry of Finance see the excellent studies of Hollerman (1988) and Cargill (1989) 
respectively. In this article, we will focus mainly on the policy of the Bank of Japan. 
26) Bank of Japan, Economie Statistics Monthly, May 1991. 
27) This group includes the Bank of Tokyo which is really a foreign exchange bank to finance 
international trade. See: Y. Suzuki (1987), pp. 163-304. 
28) Furthermore, on October 31, 1990, the Ministry of Finance licenced two non-Japanese investment 
trust companies to manage investment trusts in Japan. See: Zenginkyo Financial Review, Financial 
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Developments in 1990, No.9, 1991. 
29) Toho Sogo Bank was not allowed by the Ministry of Finance to change its status into a commercial 
bank because of its poor financial condition. According to Japan Business Today, NHK, July 24, 1991, 
funds from the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) will be used to facilitate this merger, following 
the Ministry of Finance's revision of the DIC, which enabled the Corporation to mediate mergers 
between financial institutions in Japan. See also Japan Economie Journal, February 23, 1991, and the 
Nikkei Weekly, August 3, 1991. 
30) For example, only a few years ago Nomura and its affiliated companies together accounted for 
roughly 40% of daily volume in the Tokyo stock market. In August 1991, Nomura's share had dropped 
to just 8%., slightly larger than that of its three other Big Four rivals. See Wall Street Journal Europe, 
August 30-31, 1991. 
31) Bank of Japan, Economie Statistics Monthly, May 1991. 
32) Nakao and Horii (1991), p.40. 
33) Maturities of bills eligible for BOJ operations are one week-three months, with emphasis on the 
shorter range (mainly one-three weeks). 
34) See Suzuki (1986), Suzuki and Yomo (1986), Suzuki (1987) and Suzuki (1989a). Cargill and 
Royama (1988), pp.93ff present a list of causes of financial reform, based on three categories: real 
sector, monetary and noneconomic forces that initiated financial reform. 
35) Blundell-Wignall and Browne (1991), p.5. 
36) These financial innovations and their êffects on monetary policy are extensively discussed in: Y. 
Suzuki & H. Yomo (ed.), Financial Innovation and Monetary Policy: Asia and the West, Tokyo, 1986, 
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pp. 45-78. 
37) The Nikkei Weekly, July 6, 1991. 
38) Kuroda (1989), p.10. 
39) Japan Economie Journal, May 4, 1991. 
40) Liberalization measures with respect to the interbank market will be discussed in the section of 
modern monetary policy. 
41) According to Kanda (1990), p.1, securitization generally means the creation of marketable 
securities, for example when traditional asset-based lending by a bank is replaced by marketable 
securities, the payments of which are linked to the underlying assets. 
42) According to the BIS regulations, Japanese banks involved in cross-border business are required to 
meet capital adequacy ratios of 8% by the end of fiscal year 1992 (end of March 1993). Japanese banks 
are permitted to include 45% of unrealized profits on their stock portfolios in total capital. However, 
the collapse of the Tokyo stock market has seriously detoriated the capital adequacy ratios of Japanese 
banks. 
43) See for example Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan (1988) and (1990). 
44) The Nikkei Weekly, June 15, 1991. 
45) However, according to Hollerman (1988) the new FEFTCL refers to freedom of exchange, foreign 
trade, and other external transactions, with necessary but minimum control, and does not contain the 
phrase freedom in principle. Hollerman even suggests that the new FEFTCL "... is a glorified legal 
authorization for more administrative guidance" [Hollerman (1988), p.26]. 
46) Kuroda (198S£ p.1. 
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47) Suzuki (1987), p.320. However, the securities and bills operations do have indirect effects on the 
money supply. See the subsection of modern monetary policy for further analysis. 
48) For example, this pragmatic orientation has been stressed by Shimamoto (1982), p.82:"... Thus, 
the attitude of the Bank of Japan toward the money supply is, in a world, pragmatic." And also by 
Okabe (1990), p.16, p.18:"... the formula now employed in Japan is more aptly called a money-
focused monetary policy rather than a monetary-targeting policy. ..., the Bank of Japan has, in fact, 
managed its monetary policy in a pragmatic fashion." In Suzuki (1985), p.9, the policy attitude of the 
Bank of Japan is described as follows:"..., is in my interpretation neither that of post-Keynesian 
"discretionary fine tuning" nor that of a "x% rule". ... An appropriate term may be "eclectic 
gradualism"." 
49) Suzuki (1989b), p. 163. 
50) The maturity for collateralized calls was changed from overnight to three weeks into overnight to 
six days and for bills from one-six months into one week-six montiis. Thus, the overlap in maturity 
between calls and bills was eliminated. In April 1989 the maturity for bills and uncollateralized money 
was extended to one year. 
51) Batten et al. (1989), p.31. 
52) Batten et al. (1989), p.30, and Nakao and Horii (1991), p.20. 
53) During the first nine months of 1990, emphasis of bills operations is on two week instruments. See 
Nakao and Horii (1991), table 6, p.39. 
54) Royama (1989/1990), p.8. 
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55) Suzuki (1989b), p. 166. 
56) Tamura (1991), p.9. 
57) For a description of this controversy see: S. Wagstyl, The curtain falls on the era of the triple 
merits, Financial Times, February 24, 1990,.p.8. 
58) The relation between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance is discussed in Cargill (1989). 
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FIGURE 1 A classification of major Japanese financial institutions (as of the end of April 1991) 
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FIGURE 2 The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
Instruments Indicator(s) Target(s) Goal(s) 
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FIGURE 3 The control of interbank interest rates 
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FIGURE 4 The t r a d i t i o n a l monetary po l i cy 1 9 5 3 - 1 9 7 5 
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FIGÜRE 5 The new monetary po l l cy 1 0 7 5 - 1 9 8 1 
I n s t r u m e n t s I n d i c a t o r s T a r g e t s 
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FIGURE £ The interbank and open market rates before and 
after the reform of the Japanese money market 
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FIGÜRE 7 The modern monetary policy 1 9 8 1 - p r e s e n t 
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